Torts-Negligence- Stop, Look and Listen Rule by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 10 | Issue 3 Article 9
12-1934
Torts-Negligence-"Stop, Look and Listen Rule"
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Torts Commons, and the Transportation Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1934) "Torts-Negligence-"Stop, Look and Listen Rule"," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 10: Iss. 3, Article 9.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol10/iss3/9
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Torts-Negligence-"Stop, look and listen ride." The decedent was fatally
injured when struck by defendant railroad company's locomotive. The de-
ceased was undertaking to cross defendant's right of way at a street intersec-
tion, having first looked and listened. He walked to a point in the street
near a moving freight train on the main track, stepping without looking to
the south into the middle of defendant's parallel side track. While waiting
at this point for the freight train to pass the crossing, defendant negligently
ran a locomotive northward along the side track and over the plaintiff's
decedent. Held, in the matter of application of the "look and listen" rule,
the proper and precise inquiry is not whether the person, injured at a railroad
crossing, could have discovered his peril and avoided his injury by looking
and listening, but whether he could have discovered his peril and avoided his
injury by looking and listening when a reasonably careful and prudent man
would have looked and listened.1
Though the court here makes note of the fact that its doctrine will apply
only to instances "where inert and detached cars stand on either side of a
crossing," the decision is reasoned in the light of and in reference to the ordi-
nary grade crossing cases. It seems to disapprove of the blind application
of the "look and listen" rule even in ordinary crossing cases, saying "To in-
voke it, there must be evidence of circumstances showing that a failure to
see and hear was caused by a failure to use those senses under conditions
where seeing or hearing, or both, were available to give notice in time to
avoid injury." While the court holds this out as a limitation upon the doc-
trine, in fact it is simply the ever present element of causation. There must
be a causal relation between the plaintiff's failure to use due care and the
casualty.2 Evidence in the instant case showed that looking or listening would
have been available immediately before stepping on the side track, so that the
case was not decided upon a basis of absence of proximate cause but upon
absence of negligence in plaintiff's decedent. Appellant urged that "there is
a clear inference of contributory negligence, based on the theory that he was
bound to see and hear what by look and listening he would have seen or
heard." The difficulty with appellant's position here, the court points out,
was that he was asking the court to assume that appellee was bound to look
or listen at a particular place, in a particular direction, at almost a particular
instant of time, irrespective of other relations or conditions, citing Cleveland
R. Co. v. Lynn3 to sustain it on the proposition that "It cannot be said, as a
matter of law, that under all circumstances or conditions, looking or listening
at a particular time, in a particular direction, or from a particular place is
required." The court in the principal case points out that ordinary care
requires one who is about to go upon a railroad track to look and listen, but
it does not follow that failure to look and listen at the precise time at which
looking or listening would reveal the danger constitutes contributory negli-
gence. From this, then, there remains only the presumption that a reasonable
man would look and listen at some time, by way of recognizing any "look
and listen" rule. In a dictum the court in the principal case goes even further
in emasculating the "look and listen" rule. In the words of the court, "We
deem it sufficient to say that we adhere to what we regard as the correct
1 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hemmer (1934), 2 Ind. Adv. Rep. 1068 (Ind. Sup. Ct.).
2 "For the plaintiff's conduct to be a legal cause of the harm, it must appear, of
course, that it was a cause in fact, that is, a sine qua non, and that there was no inter-
vening force which superseded it so as to make the plaintiff's conduct relatively unim-
portant in the causal sequence. In other words, the principles which determine whether
a defendant's conduct was a legal cause of the harm are identical with those which
establish such relationship between the plaintiff's conduct and the harm complained of."
Harper, Law of Torts, No. 134 and cases cited.
3 (1911) 177 Ind. 311, 95 N. E. 577, 98 N. E. 67.
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rule, which requires the traveler to use ordinary care consistent with the
dangers incident to the crossing and its obstructions and peculiar hazards."
For authority in its position the court relies principally on Stoy v. Louisville4
and Cleveland R. Co. v. Lynn, 5 both of which support the proposition that
it cannot be said as a matter of law that a person crossing a railroad track
at a crossing is required to look or listen at a particular time, in a particular
direction, or from a particular place. Both of these cases, however, pay lip
service to the "look and listen" doctrine.6
The numerous decisions generally dealing with accidents at railroad cross-
ings are in a state of hopeless confusion. 7 All that can be said for courts over
the country is that they haven't further complicated the situation by drawing
distinctions between pedestrians, persons driving horse-drawn vehicles and
those operating automobiles. 8 Although the general principle is, of course, that
one approaching a railroad crossing must exercise such care as an ordinarily
prudent person would exercise under the circumstances, 9 the application of
this principle has resulted in a great conflict over the question whether one
must stop, look and listen. There is a tendency to crystallize the require-
ments of due care into a rule of law, especially in cases of railroad injuries.1 0
Out of the confusion, three distinct rules have emerged under which most
of the decisions can be grouped." A decided minority adhere to what is
known as the Pennsylvania rule. This was first promulgated by the supreme
court of Pennsylvania and imposes an unyielding duty to stop, as well as to
look and listen, no matter how clear the crossing or the tracks on either
side, declaring a failure to stop, look and listen negligence as a matter of
law (per se). Although the Pennsylvania rule seems to have at one time
gained recognition in a number of jurisdictions, it has been subsequently
whittled away12 until at present it is applied only by a few jurisdictions and
by them only in instances where the view of the crossing is obstructed.' 8 The
Pennsylvania rule was pushed to the extreme by the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1927 in Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Goodman.14 The court
here apparently meant to lay down a rule which should control all similar
cases in the future.15 In uncompromising terms the duty of an automobile
driver approaching a crossing was defined; he must, if necessary, get out of
his car to look for the approaching train. Naturally such a rule occasioned
4 (1903) 160 Ind. 144, 66 N. E. 615.
5(1911) 177 Ind. 311, 95 N. E. 577, 98 N. E. 67.
6 One other case follows this doctrine as set out in Cleveland R. Co. v. Lynn;
namely, Cleveland R. Co. v. Markle (1918), 187 Ind. 553.
7 Elliott, Railroads, 3 ed., Nos. 1677, 1678 (1921) ; 1 Huddy, On Automobiles, 8 ed.,
No. 663 et seq. (1927) ; 1 Babbitt, The Law Applied to Motor Vehicles, No. 4833 (1923);
(1919) 1 A. L. R. 203; (1926) 41 A. L. R. 405.
8 (1928) 56 A. L. R. 645.
933 Cyc. 999; (1918) 22 R. C. L. 1028, 1030.
10 Beach on Contributory Negligence, 2 Ed., Sec. 23.
11 (1928) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 926; (1928) 56 A. L. R. 647, and note; (1925) 10 Min.,
L. Rev. 265; (1923) 29 W. Va. L. Rev. 274; (1928) 16 Calif. L. Rev. 238.
12 See (1926) 41 A. L. R. 405, 420, for cases showing a relaxation of the Pennsyl-
vania rule; (1928) 16 Calif. L. Rev. 238.
13 Benner v. Philadelphia R. R. Co. (1918), 262 Pa. 307, 105 At. 283, 2 A. L. R.
759; Rice v. Erie R. Co. (1921), 271 Pa. 180, 114 Atl. 640; Flick v. Northampton &
B. R. Co. (1922), 274 Pa. 347, 118 Atl. 250; Newman v. Reading Co. (1925), 283 Pa.
416, 129 Atl. 450; Hines v. Cooper (1920), 205 Ala. 70, 88 So. 133; Pennsylvania R. Co.
v. Yingling (1925), 248 Md. 169, 129 At. 36; Hardy v. Pere Marquette R. Co. (1920),
208 Mich. 632, 175 N. W. 462; Kimbraugh v. Hines (1920), 180 N. C. 274, 104 S. E.
684; (1928) 4 Wis. L. Rev. 467.
14 (1927) 275 U. S. 66, 72 L. ed. 167, 48 Sup. Ct. 24.
15 "But we are dealing with a standard of conduct, and when the standard is clear it
should be laid down once for all by the courts." Per Holmes, J.
INDIANA LAW JO URNAL
considerable discussion in the public press' 6 as well as in legal periodicals.' 7
Probably the greater part of such discussion was in valid criticism of the
doctrine.' 8 In the state courts, including Indiana, the case caused scarcely
a ripple in the sea of decisions, and, although cited a good many times, gave
no appreciable impetus to the imposition of such an arbitrarily high standard
of care.19 Recently the Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged
the severity of the rule in the Goodman case. (Pokora v. Wabash Railway
Co.) 20 In the Pokora case, the plaintiff was injured when his truck was
struck by a train on a railroad crossing in a populous city. He had failed
to leave his vehicle to reconnoiter, after looking and listening for approaching
trains, when his view of the main track was obstructed by cars standing on
a switch track. Said the court, "Standards of prudent conduct are declared
at times by courts, but they are taken over from the facts of life. To get out
of a vehicle and reconnoiter is an uncommon precaution, as everyday experi-
ence informs us. Besides being uncommon, it is very likely to be futile, and
sometimes even dangerous. If the driver leaves his vehicle when he nears
a cut or curve, he will learn nothing by getting out about the perils that lurk
beyond. By the time he regains his seat and sets his car in motion, the
hidden train may be upon him."'2 1
By the Pokora case the Supreme Court of the United States favors the
second rule, a modification of the Pennsylvania rule, supra, which announces
that the duty to stop is not absolute but a failure to look and listen is negli-
gence per se. Many jurisdictions are in accord with this rule, holding that
ordinary care requires a traveler, in approaching a railroad crossing, to use
his faculties of sight and hearing. 22 The duty to stop is relaxed and is made
to depend upon the circumstances to be determined by the jury. Almost
any departure from the severity of the Pennsylvania rule would seem desir-
able. Indiana courts, as indicated above, have, with a few exceptions in the
appellate courts,2 3 consistently clung to this second rule.2 4  "The traveler
16 N. Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1927, at 1; ibid at 26; N. Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1928, at 8;
The Literary Digest, Nov. 19, 1927, at 14; (1927) 83 Railway Age, 872, 909.
17 (1928) 3 Ala. L. J. 136; (1928) 2 Dak. L. Rev. 89; (1928) Ill. L. Rev. 800;
(1928) 14 Va. L. Rev. 379; (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 532. (These favored the rule.) See
citations in footnote (18).
18 (1928) 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 321; (1928) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 582; (1928) 43 Harv.
L. Rev. 926; (1928) 4 Wis. L. Rev. 467, (1928) 16 Calif. L. Rev. 238; (1928) 56
A. L. R. 645; (1928) B. U. L. Rev. 81; Cf. (1927) 3 Notre Dame Law 106. The
absurdity of this rule on application is probably best illustrated by Torgenson v. Mis-
souri K. T. R. R. Co. (1928), 124 Kan. 798, 262 Pac. 564, where it appeared that it
was safer to approach the crossing slowly and drive straight across, than to stop and
get out. See also Benner v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1918), 262 Pa. 307, 105 At.
283, 2 A. L. R. 759.
19 (1928) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 926.
20 (1934) 78 S. C. Law. Ed. Advance Opinions, 700.
21 (1934) 78 S. C. Law. Ed. Advance Opinions, 700.
22 Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. McNulty (1922), 285 Fed. 97; Lamley v. B. & 0.
S. W. R. Co. (1924), 298 Fed. 916; Friesner Fruit Co. v. Chicago G. W. R. Co. (1924),
199 Ia. 1143, 201 N. W. 112; Sullivan v. Boston & M. R. R. Co. (1922), 242 Mass. 188,
136 N. E. 373; Sutter v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co. (1925), 230 Mich. 489, 202 N. W. 967;
Capretz v. Chicago G. W. R. Co. (1923), 157 Minn. 29, 195 N. V. 531; Le Febvre v.
Central Vt. Ry. Co. (1924), 97 Vt. 342, 123 Atl. 211; Kansas v. C. M. & St. P. R. Co.(1923), 180 Wis. 49, 192 N. W. 383.
23 Cleveland R. Co. v. Penketh (1901), 27 Ind. App. 210, 60 N. E. 1095; Cleveland R.
Co. v. Henson (1913), 54 Ind. App. 349, 102 N. E. 399; Cleveland R. Co. v. Lutz (1917),
64 Ind. App. 663, 116 N. E. 429.
24 Bellefontaine R. Co. v. Hunter (1870), 33 Ind. 335, 5 Am. Rep. 201; Indiana, B.
& W. R. Co. v. Hammock (1887), 113 Ind. 1, 14 N. E. 737; Cones v. Cincinnati R. Co.
(1887), 114 Ind. 328, 16 N. E. 638; Louisville, N. A. R. Co. v. Stommel (1890), 126
Ind. 35, 25 N. E. 863; Mann v. Belt R. & Stock-Yard Co. (1890), 128 Ind. 138, 26 N. E.
819; Shoner v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1891), 130 Ind. 170, 28 N. E. 616, 29 N. E. 775;
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failing to look or listen before crossing a track is negligent as a matter of
law, unless he is following a flagman's directions, though the duty to stop is
usually a mixed question of law and fact." (Malott v. Hawkins.)2 5
The third rule, under which the principal case will fall, at least in point
of dictum, discards any attempt to specify a particular quantum of care and
reverts to the usual test of negligence applied in the ordinary cases, namely,
such care as is exercised by a person of ordinary prudence.26 This rule would
seem to make for a more just and more equitable distribution of the burden as
between the railroad and the traveler on the highway. "Assuming that rapid
and safe transportation over railroads is a present day necessity, it cannot be
overlooked that because of the increase in the number of automobiles and
improved highways, rapid and safe transportation over these public highways
is equally essential. In this connection, Mr. Justice Bradley, in Continental
Improvement Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161, said: 'The obligations, rights, and
duties of the railroads and the travelers upon intersecting highways are
mutual and reciprocal.' "27 Any stop, look and listen rule or any vestige of
it places upon the traveler an undue burden without placing any reciprocal
duty or obligation upon the railroad. This may be conducive to carelessness
and recklessness on the part of the railroad in the operation of its trains and
in the care and construction of the crossings.2s Certainly the tendency, illus-
trated by variations of the stop, look and listen doctrine, of resolving mixed
questions of law and fact into inflexible rules, seems undesirable, 29 for no
matter how sound it may be in theory,30 in fact it encourages the all too com-
mon practice of urging witnesses to swear up to a headnote.3 '
As already noted, as a result of the principal case, if we have anything
left of the "look and listen" doctrine, it is only the rather absurd vestige that
one must have looked and listened at some time, whether a reasonable man
would have done so or not. It may be that a reasonable man would not have
looked or listened at all under the circumstances. Is there any reason for
clinging to this vestige of what is generally conceded to be a vicious doctrine?
It is submitted that the court in the principal case might even more clearly
have abandoned the "look and listen" doctrine once and for all, setting out
the usual and familiar standard for the appellate courts struggling between
the Sylla of the arbitrary "look and listen" doctrine and the Charybdis of
Thornton v. Cleveland R. Co. (1891), 131 Ind. 492, 31 N. E. 185; D. & W. R. Co. v.
Wilson (1892), 134 Ind. 95, 33 N. E. 793; Malott v. Hawkins (1902), 159 Ind. 127, 63
N. E. 308; Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. Reynolds (1910), 175 Ind. 161, 92 N. E.
733; Pittsburgh R. Co. v. Dove (1915), 184 Ind. 447, 111 N. E. 609; N. Y., Chicago &
St. Louis R. R. Co. v. First Trust & Savings Bank (1926), 198 Ind. 376, 153 N. E. 761;
Louisville R. Co. v. Kelly (1892), 6 Ind. App. 545, 33 N. E. 1103; Chicago R. Co. v.
Reed (1901), 29 Ind. App. 94, 63 N. E. 878; Baltimore & 0. S. W. R. Co. v.
Rosborough (1906), 40 Ind. App. 14, 80 N. E. 869; Lake Shore and A. S. R. Co. v.
Brown (1907), 41 Ind. App. 435, 84 N. E. 25; Toledo R_ Co. v. Lander (1911), 48 Ind.
App. 56, 95 N. E. 319; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Moore (1912), 51 Ind. App. 110, 97
N. E. 203; Cleveland R. Co. v. Van Laningham (1912), 52 Ind. App. 156, 97 N. E. 573;
Chicago R. Co. v. Dann (1912), 53 Ind. App. 382, 101 N. E. 731; Chicago R. Co. v.
Sanders (1923), 81 Ind. App. 275, 143 N. E. 789; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Boyd (1934),
185 N. E. 160.
25 Mlalott v. Hawkins (1902), 159 Ind. 127, 63 N. E. 308.
26 This rule, followed in the overwhelming majority of states, requires only that the
traveler when approaching a crossing, exercise that degree of care commensurate with
all the circumstances of the situation.
27 (1928) 4 Wis. L. Rev. 467.
28 (1928) 4 Wis. L. Rev. 467.
29 Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, in Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts,
601. (Reprinted from 72 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 111 (1924).
30 Holmes, The Common Law (1881), 122-125.
31 (1928) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 926.
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limitations and refinements of the doctrine. What is perhaps the only dan-
gerous element, in following the usual standard of the care of the reasonable
man, namely, the well known fact that juries are inherently prejudiced against
railroad companies, may be rendered nugatory by a careful use of the directed
verdict. 32  C. Z. B.
32 (1921) 21 Columbia L. Rev. 290.
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